this issue. This Court typically does not screen § 1983 prisoner cases where the Plaintiff is

represented by counsel. For one thing, the pleading obligations of an attorney under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11 tend to substantially reduce the incidence of claims that are frivolous or otherwise

patently noncognizable on their face. Pro se litigants are not attorneys and should not be

expected to know how to draft pleadings as if they were. Judicial screening of prisoner

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complaints serves to prevent prisoner complaints which are truly difficult, if not impossible to 1 2 understand, from being served upon defendants. Screening of represented cases to decipher 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

the allegations and claims is usually unnecessary. See, e.g., Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "purpose of § 1915A is to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding"); O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the PLRA's screening provision was intended to "conserve judicial resources by authorizing district courts to dismiss nonmeritorious prisoner complaints at an early stage"). As such, the Court will not screen this counseled prisoner case. This case shall proceed on the normal litigation track as guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

## II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Court will not issue a screening order in this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall proceed on the normal litigation track as guided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for request for instruction (ECF No. 38) and motion to stay (ECF No. 47) are denied as moot.

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DATED: This 22nd day of September, 2016.

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United States District Judge